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Participation in and Responsibility for State Injustices1 
Introduction 
As political theorists and philosophers have become increasingly aware of collective acts 
and agents over the past decade or so, they have become increasingly interested in the 
question of what responsibility individual members of these collectives have for what the 
collectives have done. If our involvement in “the imposition... of a coercive global order that 
perpetuates severe poverty for many who cannot resist this imposition” makes us 
responsible for that poverty, as Thomas Pogge claims, this is because of the character of that 
involvement.2 We are responsible for the harmfulness of that order because our support for 
it is analogous to the support citizens of Nazi Germany provided to that regime, and so we 
are responsible for its results just as they were.3 Pogge’s claim depends on the state-citizen 
relation being relevantly similar to the relation between the global order and its members. If 
citizenship is in some way distinctive, this could break the analogy between citizens of Nazi 
Germany and members of the current global order he sometimes relies on. For example, 
citizenship might ground special responsibilities to those with whom we share it. Indeed, 
cosmopolitan claims like Pogge’s have been resisted in precisely that way. Andrea 
Sangiovanni, for example, has argued that citizens’ reciprocal provision of “the basic 
conditions and guarantees necessary to develop and act on a plan of life” limit the 
responsibilities we have for those we do not share a state with.4 
                                                             
1 The paper was written whilst a Leverhulme Early Career Fellow at UCL, and I would like to thank 
both the Leverhulme Trust and UCL for their support. I also owe thanks to Justitia Amplificata, Centre 
for Advanced Studies, Goethe University, Frankfurt and the Forschungskolleg Humanwissenschaften 
in Bad Homburg where I was a visiting fellow during the time spent working on this paper. I incurred 
further debts of gratitude to all the following, who were generous enough to provide helpful 
comments on the paper or its ancestors: Sara Amighetti, Guy Aitchison-Cornish, Gabriele Badano, 
Ayelet Banai, Barbara Buckinx, Julian Culp, Lior Erez, Juan Espíndola, Rainer Forst, Stefan Gosepath, 
Burke Hendrix, Mattias Iser, Anja Karnein, Alex Leveringhaus, Nick Martin, Frank Nullmeier, Kieran 
Oberman, Avia Pasternak, Thomas Porter, Miriam Ronzoni, Christian Schemmel, Kathryn Schwarz, 
Anna Stilz, Christine Straehle, Patrick Tomlin, Jesse Tomalty, Laura Valentini, Peter Verovšek, Albert 
Weale, and Alexa Zellentin. Finally, I would like to thank the reviewers and all those involved with the 
submission process at Social Theory and Practice. The paper was substantially improved by their 
hard work. 
2 Thomas Pogge (2002), World Poverty and Human Rights, Cambridge: Polity Press, pg. 23. 
3 See for example World Poverty and Human Rights, pg. 135. 
4 Andrea Sangiovanni (2007), ‘Global Justice, Reciprocity, and the State’ Philosophy and Public Affairs, 
35 (1), 3-39, pg. 20. In this sense, Sangiovanni’s rationale for limited duties of egalitarian justice 
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Here, I probe the nature and extent of citizens’ responsibility for the structure and acts of 
the political order they share. If a state commits a rights-violation, when, if ever, do its 
citizens bear a particular responsibility for its wrong?5 We hold states responsible in 
international law knowing that the costs of doing so will be passed on to their citizens, who 
will often have had little choice about what their state has done.6 Equally, we also treat 
citizens as particularly responsible for some wrongs victimizing those they share their 
political institutions with. I take it as intuitive that British citizens have a special 
responsibility for their police force’s institutional racism.7 They have duties to try and end 
the racist policies, to disown the acts and actors involved in them, and to make good the 
damage they inflicted that others lack. In David Miller’s sense, citizens often have remedial 
responsibilities for their government’s wrongs.8 Whether or not they are causally 
responsible for them, or can be praised or blamed for them, they must bear the costs of 
correcting them. Still, we do not always hold citizens responsible for what their 
governments do in that way. Sometimes, as for instance in the case of the sale of public 
honours, the wrongs of state officials or institutions do not seem to be the responsibility of 
citizens in general. Duties to apologise to or compensate those who lost out fall on those 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
distinguishes Nazi Germany, which provided such an order, from the current global order, which he 
claims does not. 
5 Strictly, the rationale I give in the paper does not apply to citizens, but legal residents. Citizens who 
live abroad are not participants in the construction of a political order, while someone who structures 
their life around its availability is. However, this elision is standard in the literature. See for example, 
Anna Stilz, (2010) ‘Collective Responsibility and the State’, Journal of Political Philosophy, 19 (2):190-
208, pg. 190, where she describes her focus as being on “the distribution of state responsibility to 
citizens”, and then immediately rephrases that involving passing “responsibility on to its members” 
and a “tax burden” on “individuals”. Being a citizen is not necessary or sufficient for bearing a tax 
burden – or for having one’s basic rights protected by a given state, Stilz’s rationale for the transfer of 
responsibility. 
6 See Collective Responsibility for the State, pg. 190. 
7 Official British police statistics show that a black person was seven times more likely to be stopped 
and searched by the British police than a white person in 2009-10. See Vikram Dodd, ‘How Steven 
Lawrence and his Family Jolted a Nation’s Conscience’, The Guardian, 03/01/2012. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2012/jan/03/stephen-lawrence-jolted-nation-
conscience?intcmp=239, last retrieved, 14/02/2012. Of course, other relationships to the British 
police may ground more extensive responsibilities than are borne simply because one is a citizen. 
8 See David Miller (2007), National Responsibility and Global Justice, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
pp. 81ff, for what he means by remedial responsibility. Stilz calls more or less the same kind of 
responsibility ‘task-responsibility’, while Avia Pasternak refers to it as ‘liability-responsibility’. See 
Collective Responsibility and the State, pp. 194-195 and Avia Pasternak, (2012), ‘Limiting States’ 
Corporate Responsibility’, Journal of Political Philosophy, DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9760.2012.00423.x, pg. 
3. This is the kind of responsibility I am concerned with here, and I make no claims about other kinds 
of responsibility, particularly the responsibility all three of those authors distinguish the 
responsibility they are interested in from, the responsibility that justifies praise and blame. 
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involved in the sales, not the population at large. There is then a question about when a 
state’s elite should be treated as “a private band of conspirators” the costs of whose wrongs 
citizens lack any special responsibility for.9 
Various accounts of how to think about citizens’ responsibility have been put forward in the 
literature, none of which seem entirely satisfactory to me. One problem is the character of 
citizens’ relationship to the state. That relation is typically non-voluntary and profoundly 
shaping for citizens, who enjoy a stable background against which to plan and live their lives 
because of it. These features need to be taken into account by any theory of citizens’ 
responsibility. Theories which do not take proper account of the pervasive, massive coercive 
power of the state will fail. However, that feature of the state will need to be integrated into 
the theory in the right way. I will try to show that existing ‘political’ accounts fail because 
they cannot select amongst our plausible judgments about citizens’ responsibility in a way 
that draws them satisfactorily under a unifying rationale. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. First, I outline the challenges any account of 
citizens’ responsibility faces because of the way political orders create the background 
conditions for widespread consensual and mutually beneficial interactions. I focus on 
accounts of citizens’ responsibility for confronting and remedying injustices their states 
commit which base that responsibility on having benefitted from or endorsed the injustice. 
They fail because of their indifference to the particularities of the state-citizen relation. This 
justifies screening out accounts which are similarly indifferent, and allows me to move on to 
discuss four cases. I use these to test the plausibility of the unifying rationale provided by 
appropriately political accounts of citizens’ responsibility. We already see citizens as 
responsible for what their state does in various ways. Even if our favoured account ends up 
condemning our pre-reflective practices of accountability, it must engage with them. Unless 
an account can explain where, how and why they have gone wrong, it will seem like an 
answer to another problem, a problem we would have if we thought of ourselves and our 
relation to the state differently.  
Here, I suggest that thinking of the state as authorized by citizens to provide a political 
order may also be problematic. The prominent version of such an account recently provided 
                                                             
9 Collective Responsibility and the State, pg. 197. 
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by Anna Stilz has two difficulties I draw out using my four cases. First, we judge citizens of 
some autocratic states responsible that it denies are responsible and second, it does not 
draw a seemingly important distinctions between public and private acts of state officials. Of 
course, it is not enough simply to show that an account of some normative concept like 
responsibility generates implausible judgments in its field of application. It is important to 
also have an explanation of the error. Otherwise we cannot be sure that it really is an error, 
or how we should avoid and improve on it. In the third section, then, I discuss where I think 
using the idea of authorization to explain citizens’ responsibility goes wrong. I argue that 
using the idea of authorization to characterise the state-citizen relation over-extends the 
concept, which anyway has too few resources to differentiate between the public and 
private acts of the state and its agents. Distinguishing between the state’s private and public 
acts is crucial to being able to cover the four cases I outline. The alternative rubric of 
participation makes this possible by focusing on the question of involvement. Citizens 
participate in state acts when they are involved in and so play a role in them. They play a 
role in an act or a project when their intentional action depends on and supports the goals 
and constraints associated with that act or project. When state acts or projects are in the 
relevant sense private, citizens’ acts will not incorporate its goals and constraints in this 
way. On that basis, I suggest that participation is a superior way of thinking about citizens’ 
responsibility for state wrongs. 
The State as a Provider of Order 
Let us begin by considering accounts of citizens’ responsibility based on endorsement of the 
state and its ends, or on having benefitted from its activities. Avia Pasternak and David 
Miller both have something like an endorsement account of citizen responsibility. As 
Pasternak sees it, the strength of her view is that it makes responsibility depend on 
“citizens’ subjective perceptions of their citizenship status”.10 Its ‘objective’ criteria are 
designed to “guarantee that individuals are able to reflect upon and assess their 
membership status”.11 When respect for basic human rights gives them the option, citizens 
who do not “signal their resentment of their state” are responsible for what it does.12 Miller 
                                                             
10 Limiting States’ Corporate Responsibility, pg. 13. 
11 Limiting States’ Corporate Responsibility, pg. 13. 
12 Limiting States’ Corporate Responsibility, pg. 15. Pasternak’s reasons for making her view depend 
on what citizens think of their state seem mistaken. She takes it that citizens who resent their state 
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has a similar ‘like-minded’ model of group responsibility. A member of a group who 
approves of its general ethos is responsible for what that group does, at least in line with its 
ethos.13 Whites living in the southern states of the USA in the Jim Crow era were 
responsible for the violent enforcement of racial hierarchies there simply in virtue of their 
views about the superiority of whites. Whether they participated in or approved of that 
violence is irrelevant.14 Alternatively, one of Daniel Butt’s three grounds for responsibility 
for historical injustice is having benefitted from it.15 A criterion of benefit has also been 
used to ground the permissibility of affirmative action for women and ethnic minority job 
candidates. Such programmes take the benefits of injustice and return them to those 
originally entitled to them.16 
I am sceptical about whether endorsement or benefit is enough to ground remedial 
responsibility for injustice in general. It seems that there are many cases where having 
benefitted from or endorsed a justice does not make you specially responsible for dealing 
with its consequences. Benefitting from the unjust exclusion or removal of a competitor 
does not mean being specially responsible for covering the costs of the wrong inflicted on 
them. Neither does hoping for or wanting it. Equally, many cases where benefit or 
endorsement appear relevant to responsibility can be redescribed so as to ground 
responsibility another way. It might seem I am responsible for returning stolen goods 
because I benefit from having bought them. However, perhaps I should remedy the wrong of 
theft because I treated someone who had no right to dispose of certain items of property as 
having such a right. After all, I should return the goods even if I was swindled by the thief 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
do not intentionally participate in it, glossing the fourth of her four criteria for participation (pg. 11) 
as involving dissatisfaction and resentment on pp. 14-15. This seems false. I can intend to do things I 
resent doing. She seems to believe this because this gives citizens control over their responsibilities 
(pg. 7). It is not clear though that we have very much control over what we resent, or that allowing 
some to avoid responsibility increases control over responsibilities in general. In particular, victims of 
wrongdoings might feel they had had responsibilities to meet their needs from their own resources 
rather thrust upon them. 
13 See for example National Responsibility and Global Justice, pg. 117ff. Although Pasternak requires 
that individuals are members according to the group’s own rules (pg. 9), it is not at all clear what 
would make someone a member on Miller’s account. 
14 National Responsibility and Global Justice, pg. 118. 
15 See for example Daniel Butt (2008), Rectifying International Injustice, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, pp. 97-133. His other two grounds are “possession of misappropriated property which belongs 
to others” and membership of “political communities which have failed to fulfil their rectificatory 
duties to non-nationals” (Rectifying International Injustice, pg. 195).  
16 See for example George Sher (1975), ‘Justifying Reverse Discrimination in Employment’, 
Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4 (2): 159-170. 
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and so did not benefit from the transaction. Set aside the issue of the general plausibility of 
endorsement or benefit as a ground for remedial responsibility for injustice though. My 
concern here is to show that they are not appropriately political. 
Relying on either benefit or endorsement as a ground for remedial responsibility seems 
excluded by the relationship between state and citizen, and citizen and citizen. States 
provide political order so that individuals with different and often directly competing ends 
can live together in a minimally commodious way, without constantly coming into conflict 
with each other.17 They are not voluntary associations we join in order to gain some benefit 
or to pursue some shared end, but coercive institutions which make those kind of 
associations possible. Treating them as institutions we benefit from has at least two 
problems. First, there is the difficulty of who the supposed beneficiaries are. By solving what 
Bernard Williams thought of as ‘the first political question’, and securing “order, protection, 
safety, trust, and the conditions of cooperation”, states create the environment we exist in 
and through it, us.18 Without the political institutions we grew up in and our families relied 
on for a stable environment, it is not clear who we would be at all. Who then are the 
supposed beneficiaries, and what is the benefit they have received? Second, assessment of 
benefits needs to be from a morally appropriate baseline. However, in the absence of a 
political order life infamously may be nasty, brutish, and short. Certainly, Butt’s requirement 
that “all interaction between the relevant parties was just and consensual” would not be 
met, even if we knew what meeting it involved.19 Without a state goods like respect and 
reciprocity would be very difficult to achieve, but ignoring the way states provide order is 
not the basis for an accurate assessment of what they have done either. 
For theories based on endorsement the problem is that, as Rawls put it, a state ought to be 
“neither a community nor an association”.20 If what states do is provide order for actors 
whose different ends mean they would otherwise struggle to coordinate themselves, then 
                                                             
17 See for example Bernard Williams, (2005), 'Realism and Moralism in Political Theory', in Bernard 
Williams and Geoffrey Hawthorn (eds.), In the Beginning was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in 
Political Argument (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 1-17 or John Rawls (2001), Justice as 
Fairness: A Restatement, Erin Kelly (ed.), Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp. 1-5. 
18 Realism and Moral in Political Theory, pg. 3. 
19 Rectifying International Injustice, pg. 115. 
20 Political Liberalism, pg. 40. 
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states should, in a certain sense, lack ends.21 At least, if they do not, we cannot expect all 
their citizens to share them. Perhaps the responsibility of the members of the private 
associations for the pursuit of shared ends like churches or clubs that the state makes 
possible can be grounded in endorsement of those ends. Citizens’ responsibility could not 
be grounded in that way though. 
Benefit and endorsement both fail to recognise the special features of the case of states and 
their citizens’ responsibility for their acts. It is clear then that we need some alternative 
account of how the transfer of responsibility from a state to its citizens occurs, an account 
which grasps the sort of institution a state is. Instead of relying on principles which treat the 
state as if it were some kind of voluntaristic joint venture, we should base citizens’ 
responsibility for what it does on the way it authoritatively provides an order for them. 
Without such an authority, human life will considerably less cooperative and probably also 
significantly more violent. What we might call the objective conditions of agency for human 
beings would be absent.  
One way we could understand the state as providing a guarantee of order is to see citizens 
not as benefiting from or endorsing it, but rather as authorizing it. Citizens have rights to the 
objective conditions of agency, after all, but face various coordination problems in enforcing 
and realising them. When the state fulfils its role as the protector of citizens’ ability to live a 
life that is not nasty, brutish and short, it enforces those rights. Because it is the vehicle 
through which they must make their claims on one another to those conditions, citizens 
could be seen as owning and so authorizing the acts of the state. Although there are a 
number of theorists in the history of political thought who may have claimed that citizens 
authorized their state, here I focus on Anna Stilz’s recent claim that they authorize it and are 
responsible for it in virtue of that authorization.22 
                                                             
21 Miller’s discussion of endorsement as a criterion for responsibility is actually aimed at nations 
rather than states. See for example, National Responsibility and Global Justice, pp. 111. These may be 
more like associations for the pursuit of shared ends than states, although it is not clear how, in the 
absence of state-like institutions it controls, with all the constraints that implies, a nation might act.  
22 See Collective Responsibility and the State. Although John M. Parrish has also invoked the idea of 
authorization through rights protection (see his (2009), ‘Collective Responsibility and the State’, 
International Theory 1 (1): 119-154), Stilz’s view is clearer about when a state is authorized. She 
ascribes the authorization view to Hobbes, Rousseau, and Kant. See Collective Responsibility and the 
State, pg. 198. 
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Since it begins with an appreciation of the role that states actually play, Stilz’s account is 
political in the way that an account of citizens’ responsibility for what their states do should 
be. In that respect at least, it is a superior account to alternatives based on benefit or 
endorsement. Unlike them, it appropriately confronts the basic structure of the problem it 
faces. However, meeting that criterion does not mean that it automatically produces the 
right answers, any more than any other view which did so would. Stilz’s ‘democratic 
authorization’ view makes citizens responsible in some cases and not in others, since it is 
only when the state protects their basic rights that they authorize and so are responsible for 
it. They authorize it as long as “its laws qualify as a possible general will, by passing a 
minimal threshold for taking each citizen’s interests into account”.23 In order to do this, 
states must provide citizens with three things.24 First, citizens must have a basic set of 
liberties. Second, they must be granted equal status, both in terms of formal equality before 
the law and a guarantee of subsistence rights. Third, at least under contemporary political 
conditions, they must have democratic rights to participate in the law-making process. 
Under these conditions, citizens are responsible, in the sense of being liable for the costs, for 
their government’s acts. Are these the set of conditions under which we think citizens 
should be held responsible for their government’s acts though? By looking more closely at 
Stilz’s account, we can see what additional or alternative conditions might apply to theories 
of when citizens are responsible for their government’s wrongdoing. 
Responsibility and Democratic Legal States 
We ask questions about citizens’ responsibility for what their states have done because the 
history of human political organization is often a history of dissatisfaction and moral failure. 
Because of that, there are questions about who is responsible for the costs of what our 
political institutions do that they should not have done. A theory based on authorization 
answers that citizens are liable when they authorize their state. We are justified in requiring 
citizens to bear the costs of remedying injustices committed by their state when it respects 
their basic rights. Where states do not respect basic rights, citizens may not be responsible 
in that way.25 If they are responsible, it will be for different reasons. Like any other, the 
answer to questions about citizens’ responsibility provided by authorization theory must be 
                                                             
23 Collective Responsibility and the State, pg. 201. 
24 Collective Responsibility and the State, pp. 202-203. 
25 See Collective Responsibility and the State, pp. 197-198. 
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sensitive to considered judgments about wrongs committed by governments or their agents 
and whether citizens are responsible.26 It must either match these judgments or have a 
satisfactory explanation of why. If it cannot explain why it demands we renounce our 
considered judgments, then we should seek alternative theories which do not have that 
weakness. 
In this section, I discuss four historical cases of state wrongdoing and the judgments we 
make about citizens’ responsibility in them. I suggest that we want to use two overlapping 
distinctions to judge whether citizens were responsible for what their state did in the cases. 
The first of these distinctions is between governments which rely on broad acquiescence to 
their claim to a right to rule and those whose position rests on near-absolute control over 
their population. The second distinction is between wrongs that involve citizens as such and 
wrongs which are in some way clandestine or private. Democratic authorization theory 
judges these cases only according to whether the state in question was a democratic legal 
state. It thus does not recognise the need for a distinction between clandestine and public 
wrongs, and uses a distinction between democratic legal states and all others rather than 
one between states which are nakedly coercive and those which are not. That failure to 
match our considered judgments about these cases weakens democratic authorization 
theory, as it would any other account of citizens’ responsibility.27 It allows citizens to be 
held responsible for wrongs that are kept secret from them, while denying that citizens who 
cooperate with their regime can be responsible for it in virtue of that cooperation, even if it 
is not democratic. 
If we consider, for example, contemporary North Korea, we can see that citizens in general 
cannot be held responsible for a state’s wrongs simply because it is their state. North Korea 
is a nuclear-armed, hereditary totalitarian dictatorship with the fourth-largest military in 
the world, and has an extensive network of secret police and labour camps to ensure that 
                                                             
26 See Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, pp. 29-31 for an account of the role of considered judgments 
and reflective equilibrium. 
27 Other existing theories also struggle. For example, Pasternak’s theory cannot account for these 
four cases and our considered judgments about them as well. This is because in the end it relies on a 
state’s respect for human rights as a criterion for holding citizens responsible, at least if they do not 
signal their resentment. See for example Limiting States’ Corporate Responsibility, pg. 11ff. 
Consequently, it cannot pick out nakedly coercive regimes, since many regimes which violate human 
rights do not depend on brute force to rule over the bulk of their population. Nor can it distinguish 
wrongs which are secret from those which are public. 
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the population live within extremely strictly regimented lines. During the 1990s as Cold 
War-era aid was cut off, it suffered a famine in which up to 10% of the population starved to 
death. Yet the party elite remained dominant.28 A defector living in South Korea reportedly 
“marvelled that George Orwell could have so understood the North Korean brand of 
totalitarianism” in his 1984.29 North Koreans may well often be deeply attached to their 
regime, but whatever success regime propaganda has is dependent on the complete absence 
of freedoms of movement and association which prevent them from escaping the regime’s 
grip.30 No regime which was seriously constrained by public opinion could allow 10% of its 
population to starve to death whilst spending billions to keep around 20% of adult males 
under arms. In virtue of that, seeing North Korean citizens as responsible for their 
government’s wrongs would add insult to the terrible injury of their complete subjugation. 
Because North Korea is undoubtedly not a legal democratic state, its citizens cannot be held 
responsible for its wrongs on the grounds of having democratically authorized it. Some 
North Koreans – perhaps party members, who are implicated in its rule – may have some 
special responsibility to do something about their regime, but North Koreans in general do 
not. The problem is that this does not seem to be because North Korea is not democratic, as 
can be seen if look at another non-democratic state, Nazi Germany. The Nazi regime came to 
power in Germany in January 1933 as a result of manoeuvring amongst elites after a 
                                                             
28 The party’s control over economic life collapsed as it became unable to feed the population, but 
the consequence of this seems to have been that economic life, beyond subsistence farming and the 
sale of food, more or less ceased altogether. See the accounts collected in Barbara Demick (2010) 
Nothing to Envy (London: Granta). Demick quotes a defector claiming that unless direct party control 
over economic life had been relaxed, “there would have been a revolution” (pg. 157). Since economic 
activity beyond securing enough food to survive had ceased for most of the population, this, even if 
true, hardly constitutes a serious threat to the party elite’s dominance. It also seems unlikely in a 
society where a couple who had been together for nearly a decade were so concerned about displays 
of ideological commitment that they did not reveal to each other their intentions to defect (see 
Nothing to Envy). 
29 Nothing to Envy, pg. 283. 
30 Nothing to Envy details the deep attachment many defectors felt to their regime. B. R. Myers’ 
(2011) The Cleanest Race (New York: Melville House) argues North Korean ideology is misunderstood 
by many, and a more important part of the regime’s underpinning than is widely assumed, not least 
because of the breakdown of barriers to information from abroad recently. However, Myers is unable 
to substantiate this second claim with data about the attitudes of ordinary North Koreans to their 
state, understandably given the difficulty of obtaining information from a police state like North 
Korea. His argument instead rests on analysis of domestic propaganda material. This does not show 
that the propaganda could succeed, if indeed it does, without extremely tight control over freedom of 
movement, association and the press coupled with draconian enforcement measures, which is what is 
important for my purposes. 
11 
 
parliamentary election in November 1932 in which it had remained the most popular party. 
Once in power, it made use of existing institutions first to eliminate political opposition, then 
to reorganize German society on racist and eugenicist lines, before expanding territorially 
by absorbing Austria and part of Czechoslovakia, invading Poland, starting the Second World 
War, and murdering six million Jews in the Holocaust.  
Despite the almost immediate removal of anything but a façade of democratic procedures 
once the Nazis came to power, the regime was popular and relied on the acceptance of the 
mass of the population at least well into World War Two. Though the costs of individual 
resistance were certainly high enough to make a mockery of the idea that citizens consented 
to the regime, most of the time the regime did not need to deploy force at all. This broad 
popular support was responsible for the ineffectiveness of what resistance there was. The 
regime could “rely upon a substantial level of popularity and an underlying consensus [on 
its authority]… which it retained in all essentials until deep in the war”.31 This meant “not 
only was resistance to Hitler carried out – inevitably, one might say – without active support 
from the mass of the people, but that even passive support was largely lacking for those 
risking everything to overthrow the system”.32 This was because in “key areas” of policy, 
“Nazism blended into ‘mainstream’ national aspirations”.33 This “massive popular readiness 
to embrace authoritarianism” in the aftermath of the difficulties of the Weimar Republic 
enabled the regime to isolate left-wing saboteurs, co-opt much of the military establishment, 
and retain the support of much of the Church-going public despite their often unsuccessful 
attacks on religious observances.34 The Nazi regime may have been able to do what it did 
without this underlying consensus on its right to rule, but without that consensus, the 
methods it would have had to use would have been considerably more constrained. That it 
was unable to remove crucifixes from schools yet turned Germany into a one-party state by 
purging its political opponents and inscribed a racial hierarchy that culminated in pogroms 
and extermination camps into its legal system is revealing about the means by which it 
                                                             
31 Ian Kershaw (2000), The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation (London: 
Bloomsbury), pg. 215, pg. 214. 
32 The Nazi Dictatorship, pg. 214 
33 The Nazi Dictatorship, pg. 211. 
34 The Nazi Dictatorship, pg. 216. 
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perpetuated its rule.35 Unlike North Korea, the regime did not rest on massive coercive 
force but on popular acceptance. 
Because the Nazi regime is correctly understood to have this character, its citizens are 
widely understood to have been specially responsible for dealing with the aftermath of at 
least some of its crimes.36 Their cooperation and collaboration makes them responsible for 
what they cooperated and collaborated with. This is the same reason, it seems, that British 
citizens are responsible for the wrongs of their state. The political order in Nazi Germany 
relied on a general acceptance of its authority to achieve its ends, just as the political order 
in the United Kingdom does. If contemporary British citizens are responsible for their racist 
criminal justice system because their state is democratically authorized, this cannot be right. 
Nazi Germany was not democratically authorized, so its citizens cannot have been 
responsible in the same way that contemporary Britons are. Either the citizens of Nazi 
Germany had no special responsibilities to confront and redress its wrongs in virtue of their 
citizenship, or those responsibilities do not rest on having a relevantly similar relationship 
to their state as current citizens of the UK or the USA. If they have responsibilities for the 
same reason as Britons or Americans do, democratic authorization theory is wrong. 
Consider then another case of the imposition of racial hierarchies, also often enforced by 
extra- or quasi-legal violence, the pre-Civil Rights era USA. The Jim Crow laws were the de 
jure codification and enforcement of a comprehensive racial hierarchy particularly in former 
confederate states, most often directed at blacks. The denial of political participation rights 
to and enforced segregation of non-whites disadvantaged them in all areas of life and left 
them systematically vulnerable to exploitation and domination by whites. In her 
presentation of democratic authorization theory, Stilz accepts that that regime was a 
democratic legal state for at least its white members, and so treats them as specially 
                                                             
35 See The Nazi Dictatorship, pg. 193, for a list of some acts of petty refusal and dissent in the Third 
Reich, catalogued under the auspices of ‘The Bavaria Project’ at The Institute of Contemporary 
History in Munich. 
36 There is clearly a point at which German citizens at large ceased to be responsible for what the 
Nazi regime did as it began to breakdown under the pressure of the defeats which eventually 
destroyed it. Orders given from Hitler’s bunker in Berlin in days before his suicide are not something 
the German citizenry can be held responsible for the consequences of. The Nazi state had ceased to 
provide a political order which was not nakedly coercive for those remaining under its command by 
that point. When exactly this happened is almost certainly different for different (geographical and 
policy) areas of the regime.  
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responsible for it, while denying that citizens of Nazi Germany are.37 This is despite both 
regimes relying on citizens’ willed acceptance to continue. Neither was sustained directly by 
the state’s brute force, though of course violence was relevant, but instead rested on the 
willingness of at least a majority of citizens not to actively oppose it. Neither were societies 
where government control was as total is it is in contemporary North Korea, for example. 
The hierarchies they created both depended on citizens accepting the state’s right to rule, 
and would have been of a quite different character if they had needed to be imposed 
through coercion alone. 
Yet, despite their often at best craven attitude towards racist domination and violence, the 
USA’s democratic institutions are supposed to make the crucial difference for citizens’ 
responsibilities. This seems implausible. What appears to matter is not the institutional 
structure, but the relation of the institutions to the popular will. If the popular will 
acquiesces in those institutions, then it and its members are implicated in their crimes. 
Because citizens are implicated in the state’s crimes, they are remedially responsible for 
them and so can be required to bear the costs of putting them right.38 Democratic 
authorization theory faces a burden of explanation. We judge citizens of Nazi Germany as 
responsible for their regime’s crimes for much the same reason as we judge citizens of the 
pre-civil rights era USA responsible for those of theirs. Democratic authorization theory 
denies that this is the case, and so disagrees with what seems one of considered judgments 
we ought to begin our theorising about political morality from. Of course we may come to 
the conclusion those judgments are false, but we need an explanation of why. Democratic 
authorization theory is weakened by the way it ignores the apparently central reliance on 
popular support when it distinguishes citizens’ responsibility for racial hierarchies in Nazi 
Germany and the postbellum USA. 
Democratic authorization theory has another problem. As well as denying that regimes can 
be accountable to their citizens without being democratic, it holds citizens responsible for 
all the wrongs of democratic states connected with the protection of their basic rights. This 
means citizens of democratic states can be responsible for wrongs committed by their states 
                                                             
37 Collective Responsibility and the State, pg. 204. 
38 Another way of putting this point would be to say that in order to ‘make sense’ to their population 
and so fulfil Bernard Williams’ ‘Basic Legitimation Demand’, states do not have to be democratic, as 
indeed Williams understood (see his Realism and Moralism in Political Theory). 
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or their states’ agents even when they knew nothing of them or the bodies that committed 
them. For example, consider the rule of Dame Shirley Porter over Westminster City Council 
in the 1980s.39 Porter gerrymandered Westminster to ensure that her party, the 
Conservatives, retained control over it by manipulating the Council’s housing stock. 
Crucially, she was able to do so because she had undermined the structures of governance 
which made the Council transparent and accountable. By the end of her reign, the 
programme of gerrymandering, known as Building Safer Communities (BSC), had become 
“an industry within City Hall requiring its own separate and secret administrative structure 
which bypassed and eventually consumed the City Council”.40 Senior Council officers “took 
their orders directly from the BSC infrastructure and the Chairmen’s Group [run by Porter] 
in particular” rather than the councillors as a whole.41 Porter moved Conservative voters 
into key marginal wards by selling council houses in them, and so replacing poorer renters 
with wealthier owner-occupiers. The evicted renters were moved into unsafe housing or to 
other boroughs far from work and support networks, and even denied housing altogether. 
By the end, the loss to the Council, never mind to the people left homeless or inadequately 
housed, was over £40 million, a loss British courts judged Porter and her co-conspirators 
personally liable for.  
Democratic authorization theory treats Porter’s corruption as something that British 
citizens in general are responsible for. The UK was, presumably, a legal democratic state in 
the 1980s. Schemes for providing housing for the homeless are surely part of the provision 
of a political order, and so authorized by the citizenry at large in such a state according to 
democratic authorization theory.42 Yet Porter deliberately disguised what she was doing, 
and was judged to be personally liable for some of its costs by the same institutions whose 
                                                             
39 I draw my account of Porter’s misdeeds from Andrew Hosken (2006), Nothing Like A Dame, 
(London: Granta). 
40 Nothing Like A Dame, pg. 194 
41 Nothing Like A Dame, pg. 195. 
42 Uses of the rights associated with the provision of a political order do not have to be appropriate 
to be authorized and so something citizens can be responsible for on the democratic authorization 
view. As Stilz puts it, the “authorization view stipulates that if a state qualifies as authorized, citizens 
will have reason to act on its judgments—not their own—as to the exercise of their rights” (Collective 
Responsibility and the State, pg. 201). Unless this was the case, Stilz would not be able to hold that 
British and American citizens are responsible for the invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003 
(Collective Responsibility, pp. 205-208). Consequently, since local authorities may sell council housing 
and evict renters for a variety of reasons, Porter’s behaviour does not fall outside the authorization 
supposedly given to the state by citizens. She was not like a guardian gambling away their ward’s 
inheritance (Collective Responsibility, pg. 201). 
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rules she had breached.43 This was not a case where institutions had a formal set of rules 
which it was widely recognised did not actually govern them, as we might say when bribery 
is illegal but it is impossible for civil servants to survive on their salaries alone. In such a 
case, we might think that since the citizenry acquiesce in the real rules of the institution, 
they are partly responsible for them. Porter’s wrongs, though, cannot be described as having 
been acquiesced in by the citizenry at large since it was not and could not have been clear 
until well after the fact what she had done.44 Democratic authorization theory does not just 
draw what seems like an irrelevant distinction between democratic legal states and other 
states which also rely on popular acquiescence in their claim to a right to rule. It also fails to 
exclude cases where citizens as such have no involvement in the wrong in question at all 
because of its secrecy. This is not a minor issue. Consider questions about responsibility for 
paramilitary activity backed by elements of the state security apparatus. Were Spanish 
citizens in general responsible for the campaign of kidnapping and assassination of 
suspected members of the terrorist Basque separatist group, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) 
by the Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación (GAL) in the early 1980s in Spain? Government 
ministers were certainly involved, but it is not clear who knew what and when, and to what 
extent the campaign should be seen as part of a broader attempt to brutalise Basque 
separatists.45 The question does not make even sense for democratic authorization theory, 
though, because it lacks a distinction between clandestine and public state acts. 
The four cases I have discussed here suggest that we need at least two criteria when 
considering whether a state’s citizens are responsible for wrongs it commits. First, they 
suggest the importance of a criterion to judge whether citizens generally accepted the 
state’s claim to a right to rule. This effectively replaces the criterion of being a legal 
democratic state in Stilz’s democratic authorization theory. Without that replacement, we 
                                                             
43 Porter’s civil liability for the costs of her policy to Westminster seems unlikely to be grounds for 
denying that it was part of the authoritative provision of an order to British citizens, and so 
something they were responsible for according to democratic authorization theory. The citizens it 
most directly affected were not compensated, and quasi-legal measures can clearly be part of such an 
order, as both the Nazi and Jim Crow regimes illustrate.  
44 British citizens were of course responsible for the general shape of housing policy under Thatcher, 
which gave Porter the opportunity to gerrymander Westminster. That is not the same as being 
responsible for Porter gerrymandering Westminster. 
45 See Paddy Woodworth (2001), Clean Hands, Dirty War (Cork: Cork University Press) for a history 
of GAL’s operations and the involvement of the democratic Spanish government in its campaign of 
kidnap and assassination. 
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will have to implausibly distinguish between citizens living in states which were popularly 
accepted despite being non-democratic and those in liberal democratic states, even though 
in both cases citizens provide the state with the means it uses to commit its injustices. 
Second, it seems that as well as a distinction between types of political system, we need one 
between types of wrongdoing. We must supplement the focus on the form of the state by 
excluding wrongs which citizens were not involved in, because of their scope or secrecy. 
Otherwise, we will have to judge citizens as responsible for wrongs like Dame Shirley 
Porter’s gerrymandering as for the pre-civil rights era marginalization of non-whites in the 
United States. 
Participation, Breadth and Joint Authorship 
Perhaps this is too quick though. Any theory worth having is likely end up forcing us to 
discard some of the judgments we made beforehand, since we often look to theories to 
resolve conflicts between our existing judgments. We need more than some unfortunate 
implications to show we should abandon a theory. We need, at a minimum, a diagnosis of 
what has gone wrong and what we would need to do in order to avoid making the same 
mistakes – or indeed different ones. Clearly, given the problem with accounts of citizens’ 
responsibility based on benefit or endorsement, any successful account of citizens’ 
responsibility will have to be sensitive to citizenship’s political character. The four historical 
cases suggest that such an account will also have to distinguish between regimes that rest 
on the acceptance of their right to rule and those that do not, and between wrongs that are 
relevantly public and those that are carried out in secret. The importance of providing 
political order explains the need to avoid relying on claims about benefit or endorsement; 
what we need now is an explanation of why and how distinctions between accepted and 
nakedly coercive regimes, and between public and private wrongs, are also necessary. 
We can begin with democratic authorization’s problems. Although some of its difficulties 
undoubtedly rest with the content of its notion of authorized states, its weakness seems to 
be deeper that than. Authorization itself is problematic. Typically, we authorize another to 
act on our behalf consensually. If I have no choice about who defends me in court or how 
they do so, then we do not think of what they provide as my defence precisely because I have 
not authorised them to provide one for me. Yet, given its coercive power, citizens are in no 
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position to consent to their state’s authority.46 Stilz even claims that citizens stand in a 
similar relationship to the state as a child does to those holding its property in trust.47 
Fiduciary relationships of that sort do not seem to involve authorization though. A child’s 
property is held in trust because the child is not in a position to authorize uses or users of it. 
If they could, then it would not need to be held in trust. Since citizens typically lack the 
opportunity to reject the state, authorization seems unlikely to be a helpful way to think 
about their relation to it. 
Authorization is certainly not the only way we can become partly responsible for another’s 
wrong. We do not have to have authorized another to do something on our behalf in order to 
feel that various reactive attitudes are warranted towards our conduct. I might include you 
in a confidence, explicitly telling you not to pass it on. Yet, when you do let the secret out, I 
and others might reflect on your deserved reputation for spreading gossip and think that I 
should have known better. I made sure to forbid you from breaking the confidence, but it is 
quite reasonable for me to feel guilty and for others to blame me for helping you to do so. 
What matters is that I played a role in the series of events that culminated in the 
wrongdoing of the secret being let out. Authorization is neither here nor there. 
This seems to be the idea that gives us reasons for distinguishing between popularly 
accepted and nakedly coercive regimes, and between public and secret wrongs. What 
matters is the complicity of citizens in the wrongs that they can be held partly responsible 
for. Their agency is somehow implicated in the commission of those wrongs. When a 
totalitarian dictatorship like North Korea commits wrongs, the way it behaves does not 
really engage the wills of its citizens as purposive agents, forming and acting on goals of 
their own. It directs or destroys its citizens’ wills as it pleases. It treats them as tools, or 
objects to be manipulated, which at best impose merely physical limits on what can be done 
with them. While a torturer might capture the will of their victim by breaking it, such 
regimes might be usefully described as substituting theirs for their citizens’ by preventing 
them from forming one in the first place. Citizens who lack that capacity for independent 
action can hardly be said to have involved themselves in the state’s wrongdoing. They are no 
more capable of involving themselves in the acts of the massive coercive apparatus that 
                                                             
46 It has been standard to hold that citizens cannot consent to their state at least since A. J. Simmons’ 
(1979) Moral Principles and Political Obligations, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
47 See Collective Responsibility and the State, pg. 201. 
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controls them than marionettes are in those of their puppeteers. Unlike the citizens of a 
state that operates through its citizens’ acceptance of its right to rule, their agency is not 
implicated in any wrongs their state commits. 
Similarly, when a state commits a wrong secretly, it does not depend on citizens’ acceptance 
of a right to rule. It conceals what is being done with resources supplied by those citizens 
and so does not implicate their agency because their cooperation is not needed. The ability 
to commit wrongs like Dame Shirley Porter’s gerrymandering may depend on citizens’ 
acceptance of a state’s right to rule, but only in the same sense that leaving my flat to go to 
work makes it possible for a burglar to break in and steal my stereo. That kind of 
dependence does not warrant a sharing or transfer of responsibility. The relation is best 
described as one of exploitation or manipulation, and so does not engage the will of other 
agents it relies on. Since they are used rather than involved, it appears unreasonable to 
expect them to bear any special responsibility another’s wrongdoing. 
Participation is the key concept here. It is because agents play a role, are participants, in 
another’s wrongdoing that we can attribute some responsibility to them for that 
wrongdoing. As Christopher Kutz has argued at length, participation does not require 
consenting to or endorsing, or making a causal difference, yet it is enough to make an agent 
complicit in the wrongdoing of another, whether that other is an individual or collective 
agent.48 When an agent acts as part of a collective, because of the way that what they are 
doing is mutually dependent on what other members of the collective do, there is a sense in 
which the acts of the collective can be attributed to them. Although they cannot have the 
acts of the collective exclusively attributed to them, as having written this paper can be 
exclusively attributed to me, those acts can be inclusively attributed to them, and that is 
enough for some responsibility.49 What Kutz has in mind here is the sense in which I can 
have had a vicious fight or danced a lovely tango, even though in both cases someone else 
needed to be involved since it is impossible for me to have done those things alone. I danced 
a lovely tango or had a vicious fight only because we danced a lovely tango or had a vicious 
                                                             
48 See his (2000) Complicity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
49 See the discussion in Complicity, pp. 139-141. Although Kutz says there that the difference is that 
exclusive attributions “presuppose” causality, he elsewhere argues that giving an account of causation 
absent a rich and normative account of agency is impossible. See Complicity, pp. 40-42 and 51-52. 
Hence the difference is one of degree, not of kind. 
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fight, and I may be proud of our tango or ashamed of our fight only because of what we have 
done. Reactive attitudes towards me become appropriate because of my participation in our 
collective acts. 
Participation in this sense does not depend on control over its consequences or making a 
difference to what happens more generally. Consider Bernard Williams’ example of George 
the chemist.50 George is unemployed and frail, and offered work in a chemical and 
biological weapons laboratory. If he does not accept the work, a more ambitious 
contemporary will and so make the laboratory more effective than George would. It is 
consequentially worse, even for George given his situation, for him to refuse the offer. Yet, 
even though George only reduces the danger of the laboratory’s work and has no input into 
the military’s decisions about how to use it, we feel that he is in some way implicated in 
what it does and so responsible for involving himself in it.  
Indeed, Williams’ use of the case to illustrate the importance of integrity as a virtue depends 
on George’s implication in what the laboratory does. This is presumably because of the way 
what he does in the laboratory is structured around serving his funder’s project of 
producing biological and chemical weapons. As Kutz puts it when discussing a similar case, 
such work is morally problematic because it “is counterfactually sensitive to the promotion 
of [his funder’s] goals and the observance of their constraints”.51 Because of that, as a 
purposive agent, George can in some sense be held responsible for what the military does 
with the work he produces. By promoting their goals and observing their constraints, he 
plays a role within the project and so we can inclusively attribute their acts to him. Notice 
that no act of authorization or consent need have occurred. George may continually refuse 
to grant his superiors permission to use his work in the way they do, yet as long as he 
continues to do his work, he continues to be governed by their plans.52 
                                                             
50 Bernard Williams (1988), ‘Consequentialism and Integrity’, in Consequentialism and its Critics, pp. 
20-50, ed. Samuel Scheffler, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 33-4. 
51 Complicity, pg. 164. Here, Kutz is discussing the case of a scientist, Miriam, who works for the 
military. I use Williams’ case instead because it predates Kutz’s work and so emphasises how 
common thinking in the way he suggests we do is, and because the case more clearly shows that 
making a causal difference to and controlling what we are responsible for are not always relevant. 
52 This is sufficient to show that George does not necessarily consent. We do not consent to 
something simply by being aware that it will happen if we continue some course of action. 
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To see whether an agent is a participant in some collective wrong then, we need to know 
what the goals and constraints of the agent committing the wrong are and whether the 
possibly complicit agent is promoting and observing them. There has to be a sense in which 
we can attribute the aims of the collective to a participant in its act through what Kutz calls a 
participatory intention.53 Two things seem to need to be true to warrant calling some agent 
a participant in another’s wrong. First, there needs to be a project broad enough to 
encompass what both of them did. George the chemist could be contrasted with Georgina, 
whose work on the spread of disease through a population just happens to be useful to 
chemical and biological weapons manufacturers. Her work may be more helpful to the 
military than George’s, whose frailty and scruples may limit his effectiveness. Yet she is not 
involved in or responsible for their wrongdoing in the same way.54 She is not a participant 
in their project, because her acts are not structured by their constraints and so there is no 
project they share. Call this the breadth criterion.55 Second, the participant needs to have 
acted to further the ends of that project, to have not merely been a tool of it. Contrast George 
with Geoff, one of the convicts being used as a test subject for the new strains of disease 
George is developing. Geoff does not cooperate with the military. He is dragged from his cell, 
restrained while being exposed to the infective agents and, when he receives treatment to 
help him recover from their effects, does so whether or not it furthers the military’s ends. 
He is used by their project instead of participating in it and is in no way responsible for it. 
Call this the joint authorship criterion. 
                                                             
53 See Complicity, pp. 66-112. Kutz defines a participatory intention as “an intention to do my part of 
a collective act, where my part is defined as the task I ought to perform if we are to be successful in 
realizing a shared goal” (pg. 81). My breadth and joint authorship conditions roughly fill in for what 
Kutz calls the “individual role” and “collective end” (pg. 81). 
54 She may of course be negligent in her failure to protect their victims, but that is a different wrong 
from the one George commits or is involved in. Her case demonstrates that Chiara Lepora and Robert 
E. Goodin’s criterion for complicity, of foreseeable causal contribution, is too inclusive. Georgina is not 
complicit in the military’s development and use of chemical weapons simply because she did work 
which she could have seen would contribute to that development and use. This is independent of 
Lepora and Goodin’s failure to understand what Kutz means by ‘intention’, reading it much more 
narrowly than he does. See Lepora and Goodin (2013) On Complicity and Compromise (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press), particularly pp. 80-81. 
55 The failure to meet the breadth criterion makes me sceptical about Kutz’s attempt to apply his 
model to what he calls ‘unstructured harms’ (see Complicity, pp. 166-203). It seems to me that the 
harms he discusses there are not ones where people can really be seen as playing a role in a collective 
project because their intentions are not structured by any such project. 
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We then have two criteria, the breadth criteria and the joint authorship criteria. We 
participate in a collective project if our intentions are structured by its goals and 
constraints. The joint authorship criterion responds to the importance of our intentions, 
while the breadth criterion responds to the importance of the project’s goals and 
constraints. Again, let me reiterate that this is different from consent or authorization. We 
can intend to do things we did not consent to doing, just as intentions can be sensitive to a 
project’s goals and constraints without having authorized that project. I intend to pay my 
taxes when I send back my self-assessment form, though I have not consented to, just as that 
intention is structured by the goals and constraints of the project of tax collection whether 
or not I authorize it. Nor will all instances of consent or authorization be participatory. I may 
consent to and authorize an operation under anaesthesia, but do not participate in it.  
Notice the similarity between the two criteria for participation in general, of breadth and 
joint authorship, and the two criteria I claimed earlier were needed by a successful account 
of when citizens are responsible for their state’s wrongdoing. The distinction between 
wrongs that are carried out in secret and those that are carried out publicly is an instance of 
the breadth criterion. Equally, distinguishing states that are nakedly coercive and those that 
are generally accepted is one way of distinguishing between those that involve their citizens 
as joint authors and those that do not. That the two criteria for citizens’ responsibility can 
be related to the two criteria for participation, of course, does not show that they are the 
right way to think about citizens’ responsibility for state wrongs. What it does do is show 
that as criteria they can be linked to the framework of participation. That means there is an 
explanation of not just where the democratic authorization account went wrong, but how to 
correct its errors. If there are reasons to generally think about our involvement in the 
wrongs of others in terms of participation, then there are reasons to think about citizens’ 
involvement in their states’ wrongs in particular in those terms. That, the joint authorship 
and breadth criteria imply, means drawing distinctions of the sort I have argued the 
democratic authorization account struggles with. 
An account of citizens’ responsibility for state wrongs built around the idea of participation 
would, then, explain and correct the problems of using the idea of authorization to justify 
citizens having to remedy their state’s wrongdoing. Even if that means we should give up on 
the idea of authorization, it does not mean that participation must be the answer to why and 
when citizens are responsible for their state’s wrongdoing. Showing that would mean 
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showing that there are no problems with using participation as the basis of an account of 
citizens’ responsibility, and I clearly have not done that. However, if participation is a better 
framework for explaining when citizens are responsible than at least one prominent 
alternative, we at least have reason to explore it. We need to check whether a theory built 
around the idea of participation can be made to fit well with a range of judgments about 
citizens’ responsibility beyond those I have pointed to in this paper. By way of conclusion, let 
me suggest how that search might begin. 
The two criteria of breadth and joint authorship must be interpreted for the case of 
citizenship. In order to know whether a citizen is a participant in their state, we need to 
understand what the project the state should be seen as engaged in is and how to judge 
whether it is using its citizens as mere tools to pursue it. In discussing accounts of citizens’ 
responsibility based on endorsement and benefit in the first section of the paper, I 
suggested that any account of citizens’ responsibility would need to be sensitive to the kind 
of activity that politics is. It involves providing ourselves with an order that makes it 
possible for us to pursue our different ends in relative peace with one another, including 
through arrangements we make with each other. I claimed that because of that it cannot be 
done consensually or on the basis of shared ends, and lacks a baseline that we could assess 
its benefits from. This is why consent, endorsement and benefit are inappropriate criteria 
for assessing citizens’ responsibility for their involvement in it. These considerations also 
bear on the question of citizens’ participation in their state. If what political authorities do is 
provide an order for their members, then understanding the limits of that objective will be 
the focus of interpreting the breadth criterion there. We need to know what counts as part 
of that task. This will help us resolve questions like those about GAL’s campaign against 
suspected ETA members. 
Equally, when citizens are joint authors of that order will depend on our characterization of 
their agency. If we think of citizens as the kind of agents who become joint authors by 
consent, then we will find very few, if any, citizens who participate in their state’s provision 
of an order to them. Some more minimal criterion seems necessary, yet that criterion will 
itself have to be justified. Consent is a plausible mechanism for creating and transferring 
normative powers because of the respect it shows for the capacity of purposive agents to 
direct their own lives. In the absence of a political order though, it may well be 
systematically unavailable. Instead, we will have to look for some other form of respect for 
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purposive agents and their powers. Without that, we will not be able to reliably sort 
between cases of authoritarian states like Nazi Germany which rely on popular 
acquiescence and those like North Korea which are nakedly coercive. Participation needs to 
develop more fully its equivalent to democratic authorization’s criterion of a democratic 
legal state. 
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